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ABSTRACT: The problem of agency costs of free cash flow in manager's hands has been
firstly noted by Easterbrook and Jensen. We present one of the first attempts to formally model the problem in light of similar situation faced by managers of museums being allowed (or disallowed) to deaccession the artworks from their collections. We show
that deaccessioning funds always lead to various forms of agency costs for the museum.
This finding applies for any non-profit firm and its endowment. The task lying ahead
is to formally prove the general conjecture also for the case of private for-profit firms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Deaccessioning is a problem which has been often discussed both in cultural economics as
well as in the popular media and blogs, especially in recent years due to the rising economic
crisis and attempts of deaccessioning the museum artworks by several American museums
facing the crisis. Deaccessioning is sometimes proclaimed to be a possible panacea to financial problems of museums in economic crisis, as it still holds that museums have the larger
part of their endowment in the form of artworks – highly valuable but also very often neglected and mostly unexhibited. So why shouldn’t the museum’s deaccession the redundant
paintings, sculptures, photographs and other artworks in their collection if on the one hand
they are left unused in the depos of the museums and on the other hand the museums are in
dire need of additional financial resources? Some of the American museums (e.g. The Barnes
Foundation, National Academy Museum, Brandeis University’ Rose Art Museum) have tried
to pursue the “deaccessioning path” yet have been mostly prevented by the rigorous action
of the American Association of Museum Directors and American Association of Museums.
1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This research has been written with support from the Fulbright Scholarship
Grant given to the author for the year 2011/12 and »Innovation scheme for financing of PhD studies, their
cooperation with economy and solutions to societal challenges – generation 2010 University of Ljubljana«
scholarship grant given to the corresponding author for the year 2010/11. The author thanks the Institute of
International Education, School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University Bloomington and
University of Ljubljana for their kind support. The author also thanks Prof. Michael J. Rushton and Prof. Liljana
Ferbar Tratar for their great support during the research.
2 Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: andrej.srakar@ier.si
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The question obviously entails both strong legal and moral problems (summarized by
e.g. Fincham (2011) and Rohner (2010)). In this article we will prove that there exists
another pervasive and dire problem of deaccessioning practices: they lead to non-optimal
museum management. We will prove that allowing deaccessioning leads to incentives for
managers to excessively use the deaccessioning funds and that they are therefore demotivated to raise the revenues of the museum in the presence of deaccessioning possibilities.
Striking as this finding may appear, its message is simple and clear: allowing deaccessioning to substitute for museum revenues in times of economic crisis (or in any time) leads
not only to legal and moral issues, but also entails excess economic, i.e. agency costs. The
case for deaccessioning therefore appears to lose ground and one would question if there
is any strong and sensible argument in favor of deaccessioning left over.
The article will be structured in the following way. The second section will provide a literature review and review of the most needed findings and concepts. In the third section
we will present the model to be used for our purpose. In the fourth section we will present
its solution and the main propositions for the case of risk-neutral principal. The proof of
propositions for the risk-averse principal case will be presented in the fifth section. The final two sections will conclude with the discussion of the findings and their consequences.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Museums are a very special field of research in cultural economics, and they pose numerous
microeconomic problems. These problems have been subject of research literature in past
years. The research crystalized across several main topics: industrial organization of museums, superstar museums, charging for entrance to museums and deaccessioning practices.
One of the main facts from the literature in museum management and economics is that
museums have been subject to change in their main characteristics and most of all in
the mission they serve: they have come to be customer-oriented, and their main task has
become education and not simply preserving the dedicated objects anymore (WhittingLooze, 2010). This change is being reflected in theoretical considerations as well, and substantial literature has grown in the fields of museum management and marketing. The
phenomenon of superstar museums has been researched a lot, following the rise of big
museums and their franchises (e.g. Guggenheim, Tate). The topic of superstar museums is
being explored in cultural economics as well (e.g. Frey & Pommerehne, 1989; Frey, 2003).
Charging for entrance to museums proved to be an extremely interesting topic for economists. According to welfare theoretical considerations, the appropriate charge for entrance should be zero, due to zero (or close to zero) marginal costs of every new entrant
(Fernandez-Blanco & Prieto-Rodriguez, 2011). But the opinions vary because the fixed
costs of museums should also be taken into consideration (as suggested by Frey & Meier,
2006) and most of all congestion costs should be accounted for, which accounts for marginal costs in the long run being possibly distinct from zero (Fernandez-Blanco & Prieto-
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Rodriguez, 2011). A new proposal for museum pricing has been made by Bruno Frey and
Lasse Steiner (Frey & Steiner, 2010) which proposes that the fee is charged when leaving
the museum according to the time spent there (the so-called pay-as-you-go principle).
In the article we will explore another interesting and often quoted phenomena in the economics of museums, namely the deaccessioning practices, which denote “the permanent
removal or disposal of an object from the collection of the museum by virtue of its sale,
exchange, donation or transfer by any means to any person” (McKinney, in: Range, 2004).
Deaccessioning has become a topic not only in US museums, but is also being considered
in German, Dutch, French and UK museums and in other European states. Deaccessioning can of course be done in two most general ways: either the funds are spent to finance
new collections which have been a common and mostly undisputed practice for decades,
or the funds are spent to finance daily operation costs of a museum. It is the latter form
that will be of interest in this article.
Deaccessioning as a practice brought to light many controversies. In one of the first cultural economics’ articles on this topic, J. M. Montias (1973) advocates for its usage: “If the
Metropolitan resources are as depleted as Mr. Hoving (the director) makes them out to
be, and if the exhibition space is fixed to the present wall capacities for the foreseeable future, then his decision – to sell essentially duplicate items to make room for paintings and
sculptures that will fill serious gaps in the museum’s collection – appears largely justified”
(Montias, 1973). Later works often advocated for its usage as well (e.g. Weil, 1990; Borg,
1991). There has been and is to this day also a considerable opposition to deaccessioning
in the museum world (Besterman, 1991, Cannon-Brookes, 1991). It has to be noted, first,
that the subject is not well researched, especially in light of economic modeling of actual
situations and problems it brings for museum management, and second, that it indeed
brings controversies, which can be seen in the fierce debates in contemporary American
intellectual and art scene (Rohner, 2010; Whitting-Looze, 2010; Fincham, 2011; Rosenbaum, 2009-2012; Zaretsky, 2009-2012; Muñoz-Sarmiento, 2009-2012).
Some basic reasons for the debate on deaccessioning have been summarized by O’Hagan
(O’Hagan, 1998):
1) Many art museums have trustee status, which protects art works given in trust from
being sold to satisfy creditors; however, by blocking the most efficient use and allocation of its available resources, donor restrictions can seriously hinder the attempt of
museum trustees to keep the museum solvent;
2) Because collections demand space, protection, and maintenance, it seems sensible for
the museum with precarious finances to deaccession artworks that are unable to be
exhibited and unwanted;
3) Once allowing deaccessioning the politicians might insist on the sale of further works
of art as the quid-pro-quo of further subsidy (although the opposite is more likely to
apply, namely a large public outcry against the use of the money from the sale for anything other than the purchase of more art);
4) The issues concerning the process of deaccessioning: what conditions apply, who decides how it is to be disposed of, and how the proceeds are to be allocated.
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Finally, article by Di Gaetano and Mazza (2014) is one of the first to explore deaccessioning from a formal modelling viewpoint. It explores the situation of deaccessioning from
the viewpoint of donations (and donors) and uses tools from game theory to explore the
situation of uncertainty about the museum’s choice of deaccessioning. The authors’ main
results are that when deaccessioning is allowed, this may reduce private donations also
to those museums which do not sale portion of their collections; and that a reduction in
public grants may benefit museums committed not to deaccess, which contrasts with the
common wisdom that budget cuts hurt especially museums that choose to discard the option of selling their collections.
For our article, the key observation has been stated already by Montias: “The purpose of
this discussion is to determine whether a rule barring the sale of major works would cause
museum managers to accomplish their mission more efficaciously” (Montias, 1973). The
problem of deaccessioning when considered in light of economics deals with questions of
efficacy of museum management and with (appropriate) incentives posed to the managers. We will claim that when making decisions on deaccessioning, it is not only donors
who are affected, but the managers of museums have strong incentives for non-optimal
(from the principals and societal viewpoint) behavior and efficacy, as seen from either the
level of effort or motivation to raise the revenues of the museum.
We will evaluate this hypothesis in light of microeconomic theoretical models, formed on
the basis of contract theory and modeling of principal-agent problem. The debate of principal-agent modeling has been started in the 1960’s and 1970’s with articles by Arrow (1963),
Ross (1973) and Shavell (1979a; 1979b). The theory has been developed in works by Mirrlees (1975); Grossman and Hart (1983; 1986) Holmström (1979), Holmström and Milgrom
(1987), Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2006). Principal-agent
problem in most general summarizes the situation between one principal (e.g. person offering a contract) and one agent (e.g. person being offered a contract). Principal and agent most
commonly have conflicting objectives and decentralized information which stress the importance of incentives in the relationship. The essential paradigm for the analysis of such behavior
by economists is one where economic agents pursue, at least to some extent, their private
interests. What is proposed by incentive theory is that this major assumption be maintained in
the analysis of organizations, small markets, and any other kind of collective decision-making.
In the principal-agent relationship the principal is therefore interested in performance of the
firm and the proper incentives given to the agent so that the latter can provide the utmost level
of effort to his task, while the agent is motivated by his payment and to provide the minimal
amount of effort required (it is usually supposed that the agent has disutility of provided effort
– the more effort he provides, the less satisfied he is, ceteris paribus).
Certain main findings were provided already by the first researchers in the field. It has
been often claimed that if one of the parties is risk-neutral (and the other risk-averse),
this party should be “charged” with all the risk in the relationship meaning that the other
(the risk-averse) party is being fully secured of its payment i.e. benefit. The latter is usually
done by securing the risk-averse party a constant payoff with the risk-neutral party been
given the residual rights of ownership (see: Grossman & Hart, 1986). In the economics
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of principal-agent problem (and contract theory in general) one can have perfect and
symmetrical information in which case usually the problem can be provided with an immediate, sometimes trivial solution. Most commonly though one encounters problems
of asymmetrical information, either in the form of adverse selection, when the principal
or the agent doesn’t know the other party’s type (this can lead to signaling models, where
the informed and unobserved party is providing the signals of his type to the uninformed
one, or to screening models where the uninformed party is providing the signals to the
informed one) or in the form of moral hazard, when one of the party (most commonly the
principal) cannot observe the actions of the other. It has been shown that both problems
lead to inefficient equlibria and second-best or sometimes even worse solutions of the
model (see: Laffont & Martimort, 2002; Bolton & Dewatripont, 2006).
A special subbranch of principal agent theory deals with agency costs of principal-agent
relationship, most commonly related to financial theory. The main article is probably the
contribution by Jensen & Meckling (1976) which started to talk about the concept of agency costs which could be attributed to monitoring expenditures by the principal, bonding
costs of the agent and the residual loss (ibid.). Agency costs are therefore a special sort of
transaction costs (being of course related to pioneering work of Coase and Williamson)
which come out as a result of principal-agent relationship. A very special type of agency
costs has been observed by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986): agency costs of free
cash flow in hand of the managers of the firm. Jensen observes that free cash flow in the
hands of the managers very often leads to poor management decisions either in the form
of raising the perquisites of the managers beyond the optimal level or in the form of investing in project with negative net present value. Jensen sees debt as a device to discipline
the managers in the presence of agency costs of this type (Jensen, 1986). Despite the thesis
raising a lot of debate and econometric evidence (e.g. Crutchly & Hansen, 1989; Lang,
Stulz & Walkling, 1991; Almeida, Campello & Weisbach, 2004; Fleming, Heaney & McCosker, 2005; Utami & Inanga, 2011) it has rarely been properly modeled and formally
proved (for additional information see e.g. Tirole, 2006).
More or less the only attempt to model the problem of agency costs of free cash flow and
its relationship to debt in firms is the article by Grossman and Hart (1982)3. In this article
the authors observe and prove that debt can serve the role of bonding device in the relationship of principal and agent/manager in a firm and that including debt can be in the
manager’s interest as it can serve to increase the value of the firm, which is also in manager’s interest (ibid.). Grossman and Hart prove that level of debt is beneficial to the level
of investment and firm’s profits and market value.
Several studies have explored the role of endowment and the economics and financing
of non-profit firms in general. Papers by Hansmann (1980; 1990) and Fama and Jensen
(1983a; 1983b) sketch some basic considerations regarding economics of non-profit organisations and role of non-profit endowments. First (lastingly more or less the only one
so far) attempt on modeling the financial structure of non-profit organisations and their
3 The article was written before the Jensen's 1986 conjecture, therefore it does not address the Jensen's problem directly.
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agency structure have been made by Wedig and colleagues (Wedig et al., 1988; Wedig et al.,
1996) on the case of non-profit hospitals. In their 1996’s paper their evaluate role of taxexempt debt in non-profit hospitals and show some important results (e.g. that non-profit
firms behave as if they were following a target ratio of tax-exempt debt). Capital structure of
non-profit organisations has been also analysed by Bowman (2002), who tests whether capital structure of non-profit firms could be better analysed by refering to pecking-order theory
(which states that different forms of capital always follow the same order of attractiveness and
usage) or instead to a static trade-off theory which is more in accordance with mentioned
Jensen’s conjecture. Bowman (and several other authors, e.g. Fisman & Hubbard, 2003) finds
evidence for the latter. Among the other contributions that would have to mentioned are
studies on capital structure of non-profit hospitals by Calem and Rizzo (1995) and Brickley
and van Horn (2002), econometric evaluation of agency costs of excess endowments by Core,
Guay and Verdi (2006) and economic model of non-profit entrepreneur behavior by Glaeser
and Shleifer (2001). Finally, in an influential article, Fisman and Hubbard (2003) observe the
role of endowment and its similarity to debt in the contributions of Jensen (1986) and Grossman and Hart (1982). The general conclusion, confirmed by econometric evidence is that
excess endowments lead to significant agency costs in the sense of Jensen and Easterbrook.
Yet this conclusion has been so far supported only by econometric evidence and rarely by any
formal modeling, similar to evaluation of Jensen’s (and Easterbrook’s) conjecture in general.
3. MODEL
In an important article in financial and principal-agent theory, Grossman and Hart (1982)
show that debt can serve as a self-limitation device for a firm. Grossman and Hart analyze
the model where there is no clearly defined principal and agent relationship - they are
mainly interested in investment, its role in enhancing the market value of the firm and
the impact on the expected utility function of the manager. On their account the manager
optimizes the following function:

where

is the manager’s utility function,

is the expected value of the firm,

is the expected profit from the investment,

investment itself,

is the

are current debt ob-

ligations and is the cumulative density function. This formula therefore describes the
manager’s expected utility in the presence of the danger of bankruptcy due to debt obligations of the firm – the manager’s expected utility depends upon the utility from current
, which depends on the market value of the firm less the investment
consumption
needed for changing the value of the firm. The manager’s utility also depends upon the
probability of solvency
debt obligations

which is modeled as probability that the current

don’t surpass in value the revenues of the firm

. The latter formula

therefore measures the probability that the random variable (which is defined as simply
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a random variable with mean 0) is greater than
(total revenues are equal to
plus this random variable) which is equivalent to solvency condition of the firm.
We therefore propose to model the deaccessioning process in the following way. The
budget function of the museum is:

where

are total revenues of the museum, consisting of fundraising (including dona-

are remaining
tions), ticket sales and public grants, is wage of the manager and
costs of the museum (including both fixed costs as well as costs depending upon the level
of service, e.g. cleaning costs, costs of collection maintenance).
between

and

denotes the difference

.

We model possible role of deaccessioning as having a preventing function over possible
bankruptcy of the museum, following the model by Grossman and Hart. If the museum
should remain solvent, the following inequality has to be satisfied:

where is, again, a random variable with mean 0 and is simply denoting the random facis the amount of endowment allowed
tors influencing the revenues of the museum and
for deaccessioning. Deaccessioning in this equation serves in the role of “reserve funds”
available to prevent the possible bankruptcy of the museum (therefore if the budget is
negative it has to be less in absolute value than the deaccessioning “reserve funds”).
In our case, we use their model and extend it for a principal-agent situation. Our principal
is the board of trustees of the museum, which hires the manager (the agent) to work for
the benefit of the museum. Following Grossman and Hart, the following should be the
specification of our principal-agent deaccessioning’ problem in the risk-neutral principal
case (if we assume that the main objective of the principal is the maximization of the expected budget in line with considerations of e.g. Niskanen, 1968; 1971):

where

is the net total budget,

is the cumulative distribution function,

is the

manager’s utility function, is the manager’s disutility from effort function and is the
minimal guaranteed level of manager’s utility. The optimization problem is therefore to
maximize the expected benefit of the principal (net revenues times the probability of no
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bankruptcy) such that the agent’s expected utility is bigger than some guaranteed value.
This problem doesn’t include deaccessioning funds among revenues of the museum yet
takes them into account in their role as a »buffer« against insolvency of the museum, in
accordance with findings by Fisman and Hubbard (2003).
The above discussion also shows two important considerations:
1) From the inequality (3) and from the model (4) & (5) we see that deaccessioning acts
in exactly the opposite manner as debt in the model of Grossman and Hart. Is therefore serves as a sort of »negative debt«: as reserves that are a »buffer« against possible
insolvency of the museum.
2) From the above it is also apparent that if we are able to prove that deaccessioning leads
to non-optimal museum manager’s/agent’s decisions, this would be sufficient to show
the Jensen’s conjecture on agency costs of free cash flow in firms, if the free cash flow
behaves in a similar manner as deaccessioning funds: it is not included in the budget
function of the firm, yet can serve to cover the possible firm’s insolvency.
In the following we also make the following assumptions on marginal effects:

We therefore assume that additional effort raises net non-labor revenues and that the net
non-labor revenue function is concave in effort; that additional effort raises manager’s
wage and that the wage function is concave in effort; that the utility function of the manager is concave in wage; and that the manager’s disutility function of effort is convex. All of
the assumptions are common in principal-agent problems and will not be discussed here.
In our propositions, we will explore two possible relationships between deaccessioning
and effort. Firstly, deaccessioning will be assumed as fixed and independent of the level of
provided effort. In this case, museum manager takes the level of deaccessioning as predetermined by rules of the museum. Second case if when deaccessioning can be left to vary
and is dependent on the invested effort from the manager. It is logical to assume that the
higher the provided effort, the lower will be the need for deaccessioning to act as a buffer
to remedy for financial problems of the museum.
4. THE RISK-NEUTRAL PRINCIPAL CASE
Solving the model leads to the following first order conditions and Lagrangian function:

where we write

and

as short terms for

and

.
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F.O.C.:

where

is the probability density function of the distribution with cumulative distribu.

tion function

Proposition 1: The constraint in (5) is binding or relying on funds from deaccessioning
instead of on the raised revenues is optimal.
Proof.
We can express the value of from (8) as:

where the last inequality of course holds because
fore non-negative.
There are two possibilities: either

or

is the Lagrange multiplier and there-

.

In the first case, it should hold that:

and therefore

Because

, this would mean that the optimal value of the net revenues (

) is negative which means that in this case relying on deaccessioning is optimal for
the manager which contradicts the basic supposition of optimality of the behavior of the
manager. This shows that in order for the manager to act optimally, the constraint in (5)
should be binding (i.e.

).
Q.E.D.
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The F.O.C. over effort states that:

Proposition 2: If the principal is risk-neutral and we make deaccessioning depend upon
effort, the provided effort by the agent will be suboptimal.
Proof.
Let’s firstly observe the case when deaccessioning is fixed and doesn’t depend upon the
effort in the model. By inserting the value of from (9) into (12) we get:

and finally after simplification:

On the other hand, if deaccessioning depends upon effort (and we assume that
<0,
which simply means that higher effort, invested into work for the museum, leads to lower
need to rely on deaccessioning, which seems a logical assumption), (12) transforms into:

which after inserting the value of of from (9) can be simplified into:
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Again, some simplification yields:

where the first inequality is due to negativity of

(due to previ-

ously made suppositions) and the second is due to positivity of
in equilibrium – if
it would be otherwise the signs of derivatives of (4) and (5) would be opposite and one
would be able to increase (4) by going in the direction of its derivative while still being in
the region of the constraint (5) which would contradict Proposition 1 that the constraint
in (5) is binding.
From (17) and due to positivity of

we are finally able to conclude:

Comparing (14) and (18) and taking into account our initial supposition that
, we
conclude that the effort in (18) is lower than the effort in (14) which concludes our proof.
Q.E.D.
Let’s shortly explain the intuition behind Proposition 2. Our main hypothesis of the article
is that deaccessioning leads to worse performance of museum management. In Proposition 2 we therefore showed that if we allow effort to vary and have the influence on the
level of deaccessioning funds (used as a buffer to remedy for financial problems of the
museum), the invested effort will be lower than optimal (the marginal effect of effort to
net revenues in equilibrium is higher when allowing deaccessioning to vary with effort
and marginal effect of effort to net revenues is a monotonously decreasing function). This
shows that usage of deaccessioning funds and invested effort are indeed inversely related
and is the effect of including the (negative by assumption) marginal effect of effort to deaccessioning which has a negative marginal effect to derivatives of both (4) and (5) in the
first order condition (15). In the following proposition we show another adverse effect of
deaccessioning funds for performance of museum management.
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Proposition 3: In the risk-neutral principal’ equilibrium the marginal effect of deaccessioning to wage is greater than the marginal effect of additional net revenues to wage.
Also the marginal effect of deaccessioning to net revenues in the equlibrium is negative
and greater than minus one.
Proof.To calculate the marginal effect of deaccessioning over wage, we can use the second
derivatives of the Lagrangian (using the implicit function theorem):

Similarly we can calculate:

The second order derivatives are:

where the inequality holds because the Lagrangian is maximized at w,

From equations (20), (22) and (24) we have:
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and from equations (19), (22) and (23) we have similarly:

Therefore:

Because of the inequality (22) the denominator in both (25) and (26) is strictly negative.
This means that the last term on the right hand side of (27) is strictly negative ( – the
probability density function – is of course strictly positive by assumption), which shows:

This proves the first part of the proposition. The second part is shown similarly using (21),
(23) and (24):

Now let’s observe the signs of
,
and
. It is natural to assume that the marginal effect of additional net revenues less wage to wage is positive otherwise the manager
wouldn’t be motivated for the benefit of the firm at all. Therefore it is natural to assume:

From (28) we also gain:
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which means that the signs of both
and the fact that

and

are positive. From equations (19) and (20)

is negative (as explained before) we gain:

and therefore:

But this means that deaccessioning funds have negative marginal effect on the total revenues, therefore on the success of the firm. This proves that allowing deaccessioning leads
to decisions leading to lower revenues than optimal. This also proves our proposition.
Q.E.D.
Again, let’s shortly explain the intuition behind Proposition 3. We showed that deaccessioning is more tempting for the manager not merely due to its adverse effect on effort (allowing managers to be more “lazy”), which we showed in Proposition 2, but also because
it raises the manager’s perquisites in the form of manager’s wage, as claimed in the original
article by Jensen (see Jensen, 1986). We, therefore, showed that the effect of deaccessioning on the level of equilibrium wage is higher than the effect of revenues to equilibrium
wage which clearly demonstrates adverse effect of deaccessioning to manager’s perquisites
(deaccessioning funds are more tempting for the manager than raising of the revenues
because he secures higher wage by using deaccessioning). Furthemore, we showed that
deaccessioning and net revenues are negatively related also when observed in a direct
relationship.
5. THE RISK-AVERSE PRINCIPAL CASE
We next observe our model in the case of principal being risk-averse and prove the validity of our two main propositions also for this case. In this case, the model in (4) and (5)
changes to:

where
we assume

(we will write it shortly as ) is the benefit function of the principal and
.
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Solving the model in (34) and (35) leads to the following Lagrangian function:

The first order conditions over wage and effort are:

From (37) we get:

Again, due to

we see that for

(i.e. constraint in (35) to be non-binding),

would have to be negative in equilibrium and relying on deaccessioning would be an
optimal strategy.
We next prove our Propositions 2 and 3 also in the case of risk-averse principal.
Proposition 4: If the principal is risk-averse and we make deaccessioning depend upon
effort, the provided effort by the agent will be suboptimal.
Proof.
Again, firstly observe the case when deaccessioning is fixed and doesn’t depend upon the
effort in the model. By inserting the value of from (39) into (38) we get:

and finally after simplification:

On the other hand, if deaccessioning depends upon effort (again, we assume that
(38) transforms into:

<0),
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which after inserting the value of of from (39) can be simplified into:

Again, some additional simplification yields:

where the final inequality is due to term
by initial assumptions,

being positive, as

and

are positive

is positive by previous reasoning at the start of this section, and

is positive by the same reasoning as in proof of Proposition 2.
From (43) it is easily deduced that:

Again, Comparing (40) and (44) and taking into account our initial supposition that
, we conclude that the effort in (44) is lower than the effort in (40) which concludes our proof.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5: Proposition 3 holds also in the case of risk-neutral principal with the
additional assumption

Proof.
The inequality in (45) can be interpreted in the following way. According to Pratt (1964),
the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ARA) can be interpreted as willingness-to-pay the insurance (risk premium), i.e. willingness-to-pay to avoid risk. On
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the other hand as interpreted by Grossman and Hart (1982) the hazard rate ( ) in the
model described by equation (1) can be interpreted as marginal cost of avoiding bankruptcy, therefore marginal cost of avoiding risk in our model. Inequality (45) therefore
only means that the principal’s willingness to pay the risk premium to avoid risk is smaller
than the cost of avoiding risk, which is a necessary condition for the principal to be willing to take the risk of bankruptcy and therefore to participate in the game described by
the model (34) and (35). Inequality (45) is therefore nothing else than the participation
condition for the principal.
Calculating the second order derivatives and implicit function quotients in this case gives:

Because of inequality (45) it holds:

And therefore again (as in the risk-neutral principal case) it holds:

All the other steps in proving the analogue of proposition 3 are the same.
Q.E.D.
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6. DISCUSSION
It is apparent that we just showed several adverse effects of allowing deaccessioning funds.
Firstly, deaccessioning has negative effects on the effort of the managers in equilibrium
– managers will tend to work less in the presence of deaccessioning funds, being able to
cover for the possible deficit of the museum, if we allow their effort to provide funds for
the museum which could lower the need for deaccessioning. This finding was demonstrated in Propositions 2 and 4 for both risk-neutral as well as risk-averse case.
Secondly, using deaccessioning funds is more tempting for the manager than raising revenues. This shows that in the presence of deaccessioning the manager has less motivation
to work for the benefit of the museum, but will be more tempted to rely on deaccessioning
funds, leaving the work for the benefit of the museum (i.e. raising revenues of the museum) for others to come. This is finally and once more confirmed by the negative sign of
marginal effect of deaccessioning to the revenues – the more we allow deaccessioning possibilities to cover the possible deficit of the museum, the lower will be the total revenues.
One would be tempted of course to generalize this finding to behavior of managers in
non-profit as well as for-profit firms. For the non-profit firms the result is immediate: allowing firms to rely on endowment funds for covering their possible deficit is economically detrimental to the incentives of a non-profit firm. This goes in line with the econometric
findings in the literature (e.g. Fisman & Hubbard, 2003; Core, Guay & Verdi, 2006) yet
goes of course a step further by formally proving the detrimental effects of large endowment funds for the incentives in non-profit firms.
So how about the for-profit firms? In Section 2 we presented the conjecture by Jensen
and Easterbrook which says that excess free cash flow in hands of the managers entails
agency costs in the form of excessive perquisites and investments in negative net present
value projects. We are unfortunately at this point not able to prove that free cash flow acts
exactly like deaccessioning (and/or endowment) funds in non-profit firms. We hadn’t addressed all the different forms of negative effects of deaccessioning: do they lead to more
perquisites on the side of managers (that appears to be the case) or do they lead to investments in negative net-present value projects, or perhaps even both? To account for this
one would need to have a more specified basic model, including separate measures for all
these effects. Yet we are able to say that if the free cash flow in for-profit firms acts in a
manner as deaccessioning funds in our case, therefore if it is not included among the firmvalue raising funds, yet could be spent to finance the possible deficit of the firm, then we
are able to formally show (and have shown in this article) that this leads to adverse effects
in terms of the agency costs.
7. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
The model describes the situation in which there is a clearly specified relationship between principal and agent. In this way it improves on the model of Grossman and Hart
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who only use the optimization for the agent. Yet we specify manager’s utility only in terms
of his expected benefits from wage and disutility from effort. One could of course follow
Grossman and Hart’s logic further in specifying that the manager’s utility depends also
on bonding actions and value of the museum. In this way one would have to include in
the manager’s utility function also the utility from the value of museum (its revenues and
most of all its endowment). As Grossman and Hart clearly state, the firm’s market value is
in the manager’s own interest and therefore his utility function could (or should) be made
dependent on the value of the museum. This would complicate the model further, yet
would be more in line with original model and findings by Grossman and Hart.
Secondly, an apparent extension of the model would be to include the possibility of asymmetric information. One would expect that in the presence of deaccessioning, moral hazard problems would be extended and managers would tend to shirk to the expense of the
principals and museum in general.
There are many other extensions that could be made to the specification of the principalagent problem in our model. One could firstly argue about the choice of principal and
agent. In one of the rare existing articles on principal-agent modeling in cultural economics Prieto-Rodriguez and Fernandez-Blanco (2006) consider the public agency (providing
subsidies) to be the principal and the museum (or its board) to be the agent in museum
financing decisions. One could also argue that museum has multiple principals: both the
board of trustees as well as the donors can serve the role of principals. It would be interesting to include multiple principals (or even multiple agents) in our principal-agent problem following work of e.g. Bernheim & Whinston (1986), Li (1993), Martimort (1996),
Waterman & Meier (1998) and Gailmard (2002), taking into account the externalities of
one principal-agent relation for another principal-agent relation. One could furthermore
argue that museums follow versatile objectives beside revenue maximization and are motivated by educational, aesthetic and other purposes as well. To this task, the extensions
following Holmström and Milgrom’s 1991 multitasking model would be most appropriate. One could also speculate that principal can follow a more general utility function and
is not risk neutral as presupposed in our article. Yet we consider this observation would
change nothing in the results of this paper which is demonstrated in the appendix.
One further extension of course concerns econometric evidence. Unfortunately the data
on deaccessioning are not available presently in 990’ non-profit organizations’ forms,
therefore an econometric study would be of only limited scope. One could of course try to
gather the data by using questionnaires sent to museums. Still we consider that deaccessioning is considered as “barely legal” practice in American (and even more-so in other)
museums, therefore the answers to questionnaires would be probably prone to a large
non-response bias. Nevertheless, one would be able to show that excess endowment of
museums in general contributes adversely to the benefit of the museum and positively to
the perquisites of museum managers.
Another extension considers the solutions to the problems shown in the model. We were
able to show the negative effects of deaccessioning to the incentives for managers in mu-
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seums. One would be obliged to further explore if (and how) this problem could be prevented and if there is any mechanism to reduce the agency costs of allowing for deaccessioning. One would be tempted to use the literature in mechanism design theory to
resolve this problem.
Finally, the proof in our article is still insufficient to prove the Jensen’s agency costs of free
cash flow conjecture for the case of for-profit firms. This question, therefore, remains open
for future research, yet we believe the methods in our article should provide sufficient
research directions for final solution to this problem in financial theory and theory of the
firm.
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